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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE yr" June 22 1025~ 
1/~1 
PEACE AND BERLIN 
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I hope 
now to take a few minutes of the Sen-
ate's Lime to discuss the speech made by 
our distinguished majority leader on 
Thursday last with respect t o the Ger-
man situation, and particularly with 
r espect to BE'rlin. 
In that connection. I send to the desk 
a r esolution for appropriate reference. 
'lhe VICE PRESIDENT. The resolu-
tion will be rec~ived and appropriately 
referred. 
The resolution CS. Res. 161) was re-
ferred to the Committee on Foreign R e-
lations and ordered to be printed in tne 
HEcor.v, as follows: 
R E£0LUT10N 
Whcrc~s the Soviet Union has r enewed Its 
thre~ts to Berlln and h'ls ls~u~d a demand 
for a solution by the end of the year . there-
by C<'Ltlnmng Its pressure on the three 
power~ there: and 
Wh~rens this ultimatum Is In violation of 
t he JOint u n(lcr tal;lngs o! Great Britain 
:F'ranc~. the Soviet Union, and t he United 
St:otes nt the end of World Wnr II to estab-
lish c!Pmocrntic rovcrnment ln all o! Ger-
n-.any; and 
Whereas the ex~rcl-e of dcmocro.tlc rights 
and free polltical life existc ln Germany only 
In the Western sectors of Berlln and the 
Feclcrnl I~opublie of Gcnn"ny; nnd 
\",'herC'ns the United States, ln concert with 
Grent Br!tnln and France. and In agreement 
with West Germany. has r epeatedly reiterated 
1 ts flrm Intention to protect the freedom of 
the city o! Berlin; and 
Whereas these t!uee powers have, ln fact. 
at great sacrifice partlcipo.ted In the airlift 
wh~n Berlin was previously subjected to 
similar prc~surc; and 
Whereas these actions by the United 
Stales. F rance, and Great Br itain have been 
tnken at the repented request of the free 
cl~.zcns or West Berlin and o! their freely 
elected gol'ernment: and 
Whereas these citizens by overwhelming 
\'Ote have reaffirmed the!r Intention to re-
mam part of the free world and to resis t. at 
whate,·er cost to them. any efiort to lncor-
P"rn tc them Into the East German Commu-
.,,,t rPgime. nnd 
Wheren.s the people of the United St~tes 
regard t!1e freeclom of West Berlin to be vital 
to the pc~ce, safety, o.nd freedom o! the free 
w >rid. and 
\'.'hcreas the abandonment of Berlln ln 
, .. h~tel'cr gt•tse. would fo rce net only free 
Br·rli•l but all of Gcrmnny to seck a com-
., " "·~ nccommodation with the Soviet 
:t. and 
\\ btreas ~he Isolation and n eutraliza tion 
of G~rm·my demanded by the Soviet Union 
ns a prtce of such accommodation would ln-
••<c !p.tbly make that country a marshalling 
f!t\.Hlnd f,jr further Soviet advances, uncler-
n :::ill'' the North Atlantic Treaty Org_ani-
'' . • deotroylng the painstaking construc-
t!·. e work toward European unification, 
"hnuz!llg the European continent once 
aw mto Isolated and Indefensible states, 
'rl tiHPatenlng the ultimate d estruction of 
the liberties of the millions of Europeans 
who now enjoy the blessings of freedom; 
and 
Whereas the consequences of each of these 
developments would be the significant weak-
ening of the defenses of the United States 
and the freedom of Its people: Now, there-
f ore, be lt 
R esolved , That it is the sense or the Scn-
~te that-
( 1) The United States 'hould continue 
t.o seck four-power negotiations with the 
Governments of France, the United King-
dom, and the U.S.S.R. with the Govern-
ments of the Gerrna'1 Federal Republic and 
the E,•st German regime present. respec-
tive!;•. In 'uch negotiations. on the mea ns 
whPrehy n free nnd united Germany may be 
c:-~at~d and within lt a free and united 
Berlin; 
(2) T he United States sh ould, In such 
ne:;ot.i.1tlons, seek 1nenns by which the secu-
rity of Europe, both E n.st and West, may be 
gunra 'lteed; 
(3) The United States shou1d not accept a 
unllateral abrogation by the Union of Soviet 
Socialis t Republlc of the post World War II 
agreements regarding access to Berlin, the 
rights of the people of Berlln, or the reuni-
fication of Germany as afiectlng ln any way 
the rlght.s and responsibllltles of the Western 
powers; 
(4) The United States should take what-
ever m easures may be required-together, If 
possible, with France and the United King-
dom-to maintain access to West Berlin from 
West Germany on all the routes that have 
been by agreement with the Soviet Union 
assigned to the United Kingdom, France, 
a nd the United States for themselves and 
for the benefit of the people of West Berlln. 
Mr. JAVITS. I quote these words at 
the beginning of my speech : 
On Thursday last the distinguished ma-
jority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, of Mon-
tana, made an Important speech In this 
Chamber on the German situation. 
These are the very words I used on 
February 19, 1959, in opening my own 
statement in response to a speech on 
the Geiman crisis made a few days 
earlier by Senator MANSFIELD, then dep-
uty majority leader. At that time I 
spoke to precisely the same situation 
which faces us today. So did the Sen-
ator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD]. 
On Thursday last, June 15, 1961, some 
2 years and 4 months later, the Senator 
from Montana delivered another speech 
on the German situation. But nothing 
appears to h ave changed. He again is 
in favor of the creation of a free city, 
not in West Berlin alone, but in the cre-
ation of a free city which embraces all 
Berlin. 
Let us compare this with his speech 
2 years ago. It is important to remem-
ber that Senator MANSFIELD's speech of 
February 1959 was within the direct con-
text of the then existing crisis on Ber-
lin, which occurred when the Soviet 
Union in November 1958 announced its 
intention to take unilateral action on 
Berlin if its proposal for an East and 
West German committee was rejected 
by the West. No\v, almost 2V2 year~ 
later, we have Chairman Khrushchev's 
new ultimatum to President K ennedy 
that the West must get out by the end 
of December or the U.S.S.R. will sign 
a separate peace treaty with East Ger-
many. 
The Senator from Montana [Mr. 
MANSFIELD] was speaking in light Of 
L 
Premier ~hchev's ultimatum that 
the West must get out of Berlin. 
A copy of my remarks have gone to 
the Senator from Montana LMr. MANS-
FIELD]. He knows I am to make this 
speech. I hope, if he feels constrained 
to reply, he will do so, in his own good 
time. I merely wish to make clear that 
the Senator from Montana had ade-
quate notice that I would make these 
remarks . 
Nothing has changed-indeed. Sen-
ator MANSFIELD is recommending, as he 
did in early 1959, negotiations between 
East and \Vest Germany, this time toes-
tablish a free city of Berlin instead of an 
all-Berlin government. This recom-
mendation, just as the one in 1959, would 
mean the abandonment of the two main 
Western positions to which the West has 
doggedly adhered all this time: First, 
that negotiations between the so-called 
German Democratic Republic of the 
East and the German Federal Republic 
of the West are not the way to German 
unification, and that the unification of 
Berlin must be a part of the unification 
of Germany; and second, that the unifi-
cation of Germany should be accom-
plished, in the final analysis, whatever 
might be the interim steps, by all-Ger-
man elections. 
The Senator from Montana quite 
properly defines the words, which have 
been used before, "stand firm at Berlin," 
to mean the following, and I quote again 
from the speech of the Senator from 
Montana of a week ago: 
The range of this commitment extends 
from a beginning of words of firmness. to a 
midpoint of expenditure of Immense re-
sources and enormous taxes and other sacri-
fices, to a final pledge or the 11 ves and for-
tunes or every m:tn, woman, and child In the 
Nation. 
I ask, Should the range of this com-
mitment scare us? Are there not even 
worse alternatives to danger-for exam-
ple-the alternativ~ of defeat? The one 
essential difference which points to an 
even greater danger now from the sug-
gestion by Senator MANSFIELD than there 
was even in February 1959, is the fact 
that this proposal is made on the eve of 
an election campaign in West Germany, 
which will be consummated by elections 
on September 17, 1961. 
Anybody who knows Germany knows 
that anything might happen in such an 
election, both as to issues and policies, 
if-:-and I emphasize the word "if"-the 
people of West Germany were to feel 
that the West is playing with the idea of 
a compromise on Berlin which would 
leave them out. 
That is supremely important, because 
in a sense West Germany is, under the 
tutelage of the whole free world, grad-
ually developing into a democratic state 
If we did not know that, the testimony 
of Eichmann should remind us that we 
are a short time away from a very differ-
ent kind of Germany, with very different 
ideas, and with a different kind of out-
look. I do not think the free world can 
take for granted the difference that ex-
isted in the past and think that, no mat-
ter what we do, the Germans will per-
mit to continue what Adenauer has done 
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for that country in bringing it into the 
free world camp. 
In my opinion, Mr. President, if there 
were new stresses and strains and un-
certainties with regard to a Western 
position-which now to the West Ger-
mans is not uncertain-anything might 
happen in a new German election. Any 
new demagog might arise to try to lead 
the German people astray. We hope 
and pray the German people will no 
longer be led astray, that they will never 
have that experience again. That is our 
hope and our belief. It is certainly not 
anything one can put in the bank and 
depend upon, as we might say in the 
United States. 
The Senator from Montana [Mr. 
MANSFIELD] would have us believe that 
it is our responsibility to seek to deter-
mine whether or not there is a third 
way on Berlin which corresponds more 
accurately to the needs of Germany to-
day, Europe today. and the world today. 
The Senator further says: 
Indeed, a third way which meets more 
fully the contemporary needs or both the 
Soviet Union and ourselves. 
This is quite a reasonable statement, 
Mr. President, but the whole difference 
between the thinking of people like my-
self and the Senator from Montana [Mr. 
MANSFIELD] iS this, Shall it be the aim 
and objective of the free world to struggle 
for a unified Germany or shall \he free 
world accept a divided Germany? Ire-
spectfully submit that whatever con-
notation may be put on the speech of 
the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANS-
FIELD], it proposes, in the final analysis, 
that we accept a divided Germany. 
Nor do I take this speech lightly; it 
was made by the majority leader, and 
while the majority leader has made it 
very clear that he speaks for himself 
alone, that it is not a trial balloon, that 
it does not represent an exploratory ef-
fort on the part of the administration, it 
is a fact that he is nonetheless the ma-
jority leader of the Senate-the body in 
the Congress most charged with foreign 
policy responsibility. 
Now, such a proposal, Mr. President, 
by any Senator would be taken very seri-
ously by the German Federal Republic 
and by otner governments. When it is 
made by the majority leader it is taken 
doubly seriously. Therefore, whatever 
the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANs-
FIELD] may feel about his speech being 
a strictly personal submittal, coming as it 
does from him, the majority leader, it 
must take on not only importance but 
also influence in the affairs which will 
ensue. 
In a sense, Mr. President, I think every 
Senator should take pride in that fact; 
the fact that we think we are men of 
some competence and that we do occupy 
positions in the world which causes us to 
be listened to. I do not think we, as 
Senators, would wish to say, "It is un-
important, for it is the viewpoint of only 
one Senator." Its effect will be most im-
portant on the people of West Germany, 
but it also will have a very profound ef-
fect on the peoples and the Governments 
of the United Kingdom and of France. 
So, for all of us who do not agree-and 
I definitely do not agree-there is a duty 
to make clear our position .. 
' 
Also, I believe it would be appropriate 
in the light of the speech for the Presi-
dent to restate to the American people 
the U.S. policy on Berlin, as I understand 
it is soon to be restated anyhow in 
answer to Chairman Khrushchev's mem-
orandum, given to the President in 
Vienna. It seems to me the frame of 
reference we are now in would be an ex-
cellent time to do it, because it would 
answer both the questions raised by the 
Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] 
in his speech, and those raised by the 
Khrushchev memorandum. 
Mr. President, as I see it, the premise 
upon which our colleague proceeds is 
that really we have to find some way out 
of this dilemma, because we have been·in 
Berlin for a long time. It was 14 years 
\>hen the Senator spoke in 1959. It is 
now 16 years. 
This is something our country must 
decide. We can only submit our views. 
I do not see that it necessarily means we 
must be under pressure to suggest alter-
natives for the solution of the Berlin 
problem. This is a fundamental dy-
namic of the aproach of the Senator 
from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD]. 
We have tremendous regard and affec-
tion not only for the Senator from Mon-
tana but also for the luminosity of his 
mind. He apparently feels that since we 
have been in Berlin 16 years, with noth-
ing having happened, since we are faced 
with an ultimatum, we have to propose 
some alternative. 
Mr. President, it is also a policy not to 
propose an alternative. This is what I 
should like to speak about today. 
Berlin is obviously irritating the Rus-
sions, because they are always in a "flap" 
about it. Mr. Khrushchev indicates very 
clearly, even as recently as this morn-
ing, that this is the case. 
The Berlin problem should not irritate 
us, nor should we have any doubt about 
our legal right to be there, for we are 
there under the terms of the wartime 
agreements for occupation of Berlin, 
which make it very clear. 
We may have left much to be desired 
in regard to the means of access to Ber-
lin and the regulation of those means as 
well. But certainly the wartime agree-
ments are very clear as to our right to 
be where we are-to be there responsibly, 
and not to be starved out or forced out. 
It is that obligation to be there which 
we must safeguard with the same cool-
ness and the same determination that 
the Russians are using, not only on that 
front, but on others. I would be the last 
to say that this is not without risk-of 
course it has risk-but I would be the 
first to say that it is a risk which if 
not taken is likely to lead to reverses 
far worse in character, and could lead 
to defeat. 
I think a big factor which must de-
termine what shall be our course in Ber-
lin is to ask first why we are in Ber-
lin at all, 16 years after the end of World 
War II. We are there because we must 
assure the people of aerlin that we and 
our allies recognize our responsibilities 
for the unification of Germany under 
freedom, which we cannot relinquish. 
If we agree with the Russians on that, 
that is all right, too. In other words, 
if Germany must be unified and inte-
grated with a total Europe, and thereb~· 
we are assured she will be drdicated to 
peace, that will be all right. 
I should like to say a word to my col-
leagues on the Republican side which 
I think is very important for all of us. 
Many people have the idea, because we, 
or at least many of us, are so passion-
ately anticommunistic, that we have for-
gotten all about the Nazis and all about 
what they did to the world, not once but 
in two World Wars. There is the same 
general idea even going back to the 
Franco-Prussian War. Nothing could 
be further from the fact. We do tend, 
because the danger is imminent, to em-
phasize the Communist menace, but I 
think it would be a great mistake for 
anybody to have the idea that we have 
forgotten about the other totalitarian 
menaces which we and other Americans 
have joined in dedicating our lives and 
fortunes to defeat. I think that is very 
important, because much is made of the 
fact that because one is so strongly anti-
Communistic one is thereby kind of ex-
cusing another kind of totalitarian 
ideology. I think I can confidently say, 
for all of us, this is not the case, and it 
never was, and is not in our contempla-
tion at all. 
Mr. BUTLER. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. JAVTI'S. I yield. 
Mr. BUTLER. I must leave the 
Chamber, but I wish to commend the 
Senator for the wonderful address he is 
making. I subscribe wholeheartedly to 
what the Senator is saying. I think 
Berlin and our presence in Berlin is a 
presentation of a strong front. It is a 
great prop for the Western World. I 
think we have to take any reasonable 
calculated risk to preserve out· position 
there. 
Mr. JAVITS. I thank my colleague 
for his remarks. 
Mr. President, I have stated why we 
took our stand in Berlin. We cannot 
relinquish that stand. We cannot sanc-
tion a "soft," or Communist, takeover 
in Berlin or in any part of Germany as 
an aftermath of a military victory in 
which we had such a large share, which 
was so essential for the preservation of 
freedom in the world. 
Indeed, the Senator from Montana 
[Mr. MANSFIELD] agrees With US in this, 
for he says: 
Berlin remains the symbolic hope o! that 
[German} unification and I do not think It 
Is unreasonable to assume that It will one 
day again be the actual capital or a unified 
Germany. .. 
Those are his own words. Yet I feel 
that his proposal-this is where one may 
differ on what should be done-would 
assure the continued division of Ger-
many and is likely to eliminate Berlin as 
the symbol of German unification. 
Mr. President, I have been reading the 
documents and papers incident to the 
last Berlin crisis in the 1958-59 period, 
as well as the proposals put before the 
foreign ministers in conference at the 
Foreign Ministers Conference of the 
Four Powers in occupation of Berlin in 
June of 1959. Let us remember that that 
conference opened with the text of a 
Western peace plan which was dated May 
14, 1959, and which, it seems to me, had 
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far more promise than the plan of the 
Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD] 
'for making a free city of all Berlin by 
negotiations between the East and West 
Germans. 
What was proposed in Geneva in June 
1959 was that East and West Berlin 
should be united in a free election held 
under the quadripartite or United Na-
tions supervision, and that a freely 
elected council should be formed for the 
whole of Berlin, until German unifica-
tion was achieved, as a first step. toward 
it. There was to be a four-power guar-
antee of the freedom and integrity of 
the unified city of Berlin, and there was 
to be access to it assured by the four 
powers. 
It was stated that the four powers 
would continue to be entitled, as at pres-
ent, to station troops in Berlin. In addi-
tion, the proposal put forward by Sec-
retary of State Herter called for a mixed 
committee of 25 members from the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany and 10 mem-
bers from the so-called German Demo-
cratic Republic, decisions to be made by 
a three-fourths majority. This commit-
tee would be given an opportunity for a 
year to draft an electoral law under 
which the people of both Germanys 
could elect a constituent assembly-an 
all-German assembly-for the purpose 
of drafting an all-German constitution. 
If within 1 year, no such draft law had 
been formulated by such an all-German 
committee, then the members from West 
Germany and from East Germany would 
each be permitted to formulate a draft 
law and whichever was approved by a 
majority of the people of both Ger-
manys after a plebiscite, would repre-
sent the electoral law for an all-Ger-
man assembly. 
The Western plan was accompanied 
by proposals for reduction of armaments 
and military forces under international 
inspection and control together with 
technical means for protection against 
surprise attack and for mutual with-
drawal of forces from a new unified Ger-
man Nation. Freedom of action in that 
new nation was provided with respect 
to home defense and security arrange-
ments and to its joining in European 
security arrangements--like NATO and 
for a four-power guarantee against ag-
gression. 
Later, when it appeared that no agree-
ment was possible on any such plan, an-
other proposal was made over Berlin on 
June 16, 1959, in which it was proposed 
to limit the combined total of forces in 
Berlin on the part of France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States to the 
current figure at that time of 11,000. 
The foreign ministers also wished to re-
affirm the right to freedom of movement 
into West Berlin and between East and 
West Berlin, and to restore four-power 
administration of Berlin under the con-
tinuing supervision of the foreign min-
isters of the four countries. These ar-
rangements were to continue in force 
until the reunification of Germany. 
These proposals were further refined 
on June 19, 1959, to provide that the 
Foreign Ministers should consider ques-
tions relating to the extension and de-
velopment of contacts between the two 
parts of Germany. Also there was a per-
posal for the !our powers to utilize Ger-
man advisors In the course of these nego-
tiations and contacts, in much the same 
way that German advisors from both 
parts of Germany were adlnitted to the 
Geneva Conference In June 1959, and 
utilized by the three western allies and 
the U.S.S.R., respectively. 
These efforts of June 1959, came to 
nothing. The Senator from Montana 
[Mr. MANSFIELD] said almost prophetic-
ally in respect to the position of the 
Soviet Union: 
Let me set forth next, Mr. President. my 
understanding of the position to which the 
Soviet Union adheres In the Berlln situation. 
It Is, so far as I am aware, unchanged as Is 
ours, except In time schedule, since It was 
first announced In November 1958. 
The fact that both sides have re-
mained where they are is very impor-
tant, because the Soviet Union in its 
communication of November 27, 1958, 
announcd its unilateral policy on Berlin, 
and said exactly what it proposed to do, 
and it still says so. We all agree on 
that point. In that November 1958 com-
munication it charged that the Govern-
ments of the three powers--the United 
States, United Kingdom, and France-
are seeking to keep in force the long-
since obsolete parts of the wartime 
agreement which governed the occupa-
tion of Germany and which entitled 
them in the past to stay in Berlin. 
In short, the Soviet Union was affirm-
ing that East-West German negotia-
tions on Berlin could be and would be 
interpreted as our acceptance, implied 
but clear, that we join in the denuncia-
tion of the wartime agreement, by which 
we are In Berlin now. 
Second, by way of showing what the 
Soviet Union now considers to be a free 
city-because the free city concept was 
something that they themselves proposed 
as to West Berlin-the Soviet proposal of 
November 27, 1958, said that if a free 
city is set up In West Berlin as was then 
proposed, it--the U.S.S.R.-will do Its 
utmost to promote the attainment of 
these aims--economic viability for West 
Berlin especially by placing orders for 
such an amount of manufactured goods 
as would fully insure the stability and 
prosperity of the economy of the free city 
and also by regular systematic supplies 
to West Berlin of the necessary raw ma-
terial and foodstuffs on a commercial 
basis. Considering the history of the 
U.S.S.R. and its operation in the captive 
nations of Eastern Europe and elsewhere, 
can anyone doubt for a minute that this 
is serving notice that the U.S.S.R. will 
impose promptly through its puppet 
Communist German Democratic Repub-
lic, which surrounds Berlin, an economic 
control in which is inherent the power 
of economic strangulation. Indeed, the 
economic relationship between West 
Berlin and West Germany is critical to 
West Berlin's survival. 
Hence, Communist economic control 
would mean the end of West Berlin as 
far as the free world is concerned, just 
as it has meant the end of East Berlin 
up to now. 
Nor is the effect on the Communist 
satellite nations in Central Europe of 
our negotiating to make Berlin a free 
city to be underestimated. Soviet prop-
aganda strives constantly to convince 
the peoples in these captive nations that 
the West is preparing to accept the politi-
cal status quo in Central Europe as per-
manent. The Soviet knows Its vulnera-
bility in these nations and seeks to de-
velop in them a spirit of hopelessness 
leading to passivity and resignation; it 
seeks to convince these peoples that the 
Communists can bring about major 
political concessions from the free world 
without danger o! war to the U.S.S.R. 
Negotiations for a free city of Berlin 
would fortify this thesis for the Commu-
nists in the captive nations. 
The very implication of the term 
"free city" in its historic and legal ap-
plication embodies not the freedom of its 
people but its historic and legal reliance 
for security on the respect of its status 
by it neighbors. Are we willing to accept 
that Soviet guarantee? I have heard 
it freely predicted by people who had 
escaped from Germany in connection 
with Hitler's activity there-and quite 
properly-that if we accept this pro-
posal for a free city of Berlin, all of 
Berlin would be Communist within 6 
months--and Germany would remain 
forever divided. 
Let us consider another example from 
history. A number have been given. 
Danzig, declared a "free city" by the 
Treaty of Versailles, is not an un(ypical 
analogy. The Nazis won "elections" 
there by terror supported from without--
notwithstanding a League of Nations 
guarantee as to the free city status of 
Danzig. In 4 years opposition was 
snuffed out and in 6 years, the Nazis had 
Danzig. And Danzig was outside of the 
Nazis' Reich, unlike Berlin, which is 
within the confines of the Soviet empire. 
The question has been raised that our 
position cannot be Inflexible. 
It is not true that our position is in-
flexible. For example, Western forces 
have been reduced and have been kept 
reduced, and obviously represent no 
threat to East Berlin or the East Ger-
man Communist regime. The U.S.S.R. 
complains about the activity of Radio 
Berlin which broadcasts into East Ger-
many. Certainly should the United 
States and its allies be given assurances 
that pressure on Berlin will be relaxed, 
this is a matter which could be negoti-
ated. So, too, on the question of 
whether there should be sessions of the 
German Bundestag in West Berlin. In 
fact, I note that a proposed session of 
the German Bundesrat, the upper house 
of their legislature, has actually been 
called off for West Berlin. 
Perhaps the clearest indication of how 
the West would be pushet5 out of Berlin 
if the Communists had their way was 
given by East German leader Walter 
Ulbricht on June 15, when he openly 
demanded liquidation of refugee camps 
in West Berlin, and also hinted that new 
air safety rules which would cripple air-
line operations in and out of the city 
would be applied to Templehof Airport. 
In essence, what the Senator from 
Montana fMr. MANSFIELD] has offered us 
again is a quick one-package solution, be-
cause we are perhaps just tired of the 
impasse-or perhaps afraid of it. It is 
my deep conviction that we are neither 
tired of the impasse nor afraid of it--
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that we dare not be tired or afraid-and 
that the alternative will so seriously un-
dermine the position of the free world 
with respect to the Communist bloc as to 
represent the most decisive reverse for 
the free world which could be imagined. 
It is my deep conviction that the im-
peratives of our position require us to 
choose what may seem to be the harder 
way, but is by far the more secure and 
surer way. We must be willing to take 
time, to run risks, to enter into extended 
negotiations time and time again while 
standing by the fundamental principles 
upon which our whole policy is built-
the principles of the self-determination 
of peoples and of the United Nations 
Charter. 
At this point a quote from a speech 
made by President Eisenhower in 1959 
may be appropriate. He said: 
All history has taught us the grim lesson 
that no nation has ever been successful In 
avoiding the terrors of war by refusing to 
defend Its rights. Th~ risk o! war Is mini-
mized If we staud firm. 
We have now been in B~rlin for 16 
years-this is a very long time- but as 
the affairs of men go, it is not a very 
long time at all. The Soviet Union docs 
not seem to be h astening to solution or 
to the abandonment of positions which 
it considers to be critically important to 
its own security or to the policy of the 
Communist bloc. The imminent end of 
test ban negotiations. the interminable 
dragging on.of disarmament negotiations 
or of negotiations with respect to super-
vision against surprise attack do not 
seem to have woni ed the Communists 
too much. Why therefore should we be 
in a panic about seeking a "third way" 
on Berlin? The answer i:; that we can-
not afford to do so. 
The distinguished Senator from Mon-
tana has invited the Senate to discuss 
this matter at length . and to begin the 
discussion now. I think that is right, 
and I compliment the Senator from 
Montana for his courage in bringing 
forth his proposals , which have been 
stimulating and provocative and there-
fore important to the country. A lesser 
man would not have done so. This is the 
spirit in which I am discussing them to-
day. L do not agree with the solution 
which he suggests, and I think that it 
could be disastrous. That is entirely 
aside from the point that the Senator 
has rendered a great service in opening 
this matter to discussion. 
As I see it, it is in the best interests 
of our country am! of the free world that 
the United States should stand upon 
these principles on Berlin: 
First. We should not accept a forced 
solution or be under pressure because 
of Cnairman Khrushchev 's deadlines or 
threaLs or even the actuality of the 
U.S.S.R. making a separate peace treaty 
with the East German Communist re-
gime. They could do that. However 
they would also have to make it good. 
Second. We should await the outcome 
of the elections in the German Federal 
Republic in September to permit the 
German people themselves to give a new 
mandate as to their wishes on Berlin. 
No. 105--3 
The attitude of both parties is impor-
tant so far as Berlin is concerned. As 
I understand it, their views are very 
much the same, and that they hope and 
trust that the Western World will stand 
on the present purpose. 
Third. We should recognize that the 
East German Communist regime is not 
the expression of the freely declared will 
of the people of East Germany. 
Fourth. Negotiations on Berlin should 
be based upon the reunification of Ger-
many by free elections; the security of 
Europe, both East and West, including 
a reunified Germany; and the joint re-
sponsibility of the Governments of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and U.S.S.R. for this result. 
Fifth. The United States should under 
no circumstances accept the unilateral 
abrogation of its rights and the rights 
of its allies for continued and assured 
access to Berlin and for the unification 
of Germany in accordance with the four-
power agreements made at the end of 
World War II. 
To indicate the sense of the Senate 
to this effect, I am today presenting a 
resolution on Germany, and I ask unani-
mous consent that the text may be made 
part of my r emarks. 
There being no objection, the text of 
the resolution was ordered to be printed 
in the Hr:coRD, as follows: 
WI,ereas the Soviet Union h:\s r cne·.ved 
Its thrc" ts to Berlin and has issued a de-
mand for a solution by the end of the year, 
thereby continuing Its pressure on the three 
powers there: and 
Whcre:\s this ultimatum Is in violation or 
the joint undertakings of Great Britain, 
France, the Soviet Union, and t h e United 
States at the end of World War II to estab-
li5h democratic government In :\II of Ger-
m'lny; and 
Whereas the exercise of democmtic rights 
nnd free polltical life exists In Germany only 
in the western sectors of Berlln and the 
Federal Republic of Germany: nnd 
Whereas the United States, In concert 
with Gre~t Britain and France, and In agree-
ment with West Germany, has repeatedly 
reitcr:\tcd its firm Intention to protect the 
freedom of the city of Berlln; and 
Whereas these three powers have, In fact . 
at gre:\t sacrifice p:lrticipated In the airlift 
when Berlin was previously subjected to 
similar pressure: and 
Whereas these actions by the United States. 
France, and Great Britain have been taken 
at the repeated request of the free citizens 
of West Berlin and of their freely elected 
government; :\nd 
Whereas these citizens by overwhelming 
vote hnve reaffirmed their In t en tlon to re-
main part of the free world and to resist, at 
whatever cost to them, any effort to in-
corporate them into the East German Com-
munist regime: and 
Whcrc:\s the people or the United States 
reg:lrd the freedom or West Berlln to be 
vital to the peace, safety, and freedom or 
the free world; and 
Where:\s the abandonment or Berlin, In 
wlmtevcr guise . would force riot only free 
Berlin but cd! or Germ:\ny to seek a com-
prom!··ing accommodation wiLh the SoY!et 
Union; and 
Whereas the Isolation nnd neutralization 
or Germany demnnded by the Soviet Union 
as a price of such accommodation would In-
escapably make th~t cou ntry a marshalling 
ground for further Soviet advances. uncler-
mln!ng the North Atl:\ntie Treaty Organlza-
tlon, destroying the painstaking construc-
tive work toward European unificatlot , 
atomizing the European Continent once 
again Into Isolated and Indefensible states. 
and threatening the ultimnte destruction cf 
the liberties of the millions of Europeans 
who now enjoy the blessings of freedom: and 
Whereas the consequences of each of these 
developments would be the significant weak-
ening of the defenses of the United States 
and the freedom of Its people: Now therefore, 
be It 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Sen-
ate th:\t: 
1. The United States should continue to 
see!< f cur power negotiations with the gov-
ernments of France, the United Kmr;clom. 
and the U.S.S R., with the Governments of 
the German Federal Republic and the Ea't 
German regime present. respectively, in such 
negotiations, on the means whereby a free 
nnd united Germany m ay be cre:\tecl ~.nd 
witloln it a free and united Berlln: 
2. The United States should . In such nego-
tiations, seek means by which the sccuri ty-
of Europe, both East and West, may be 
r;uarantced; 
3. The Unl ted States should not accept n 
unllateral abrogation by the U.S S.R. of the 
p ost World War II agreements regarding 
access to Berlin, the rights of the people or 
Berlin, or the reunification of Grrmn,ly ns 
affecting in any way the rights and re~pon­
sibllltics of the Western powers; 
4. The United St:\tes should take whatever 
measures may be required- together, if pos-
sible, with France and the United King-
dom-to maintain access to West Berlln from 
West Germany on all the routes that h•we 
been by :\greement with the Soviet UniO<l 
nzsir;ned to the United Kingdom, France :\nd 
the United States for themselves :\nd for the 
benefit of the people of West Berltn. 
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ur~e 
the Senate to adopt the r esolution, to 
help erase any ambiguity of U.S. policy 
on Berlin that may have been caused by 
the interpretation placed on Senator 
MANSFIELD's proposal to create a free 
city of Dcrlin; or, for that matter, 
that may have been caused by my 
speech or the speech of any other 
Senator who has spoken on the subject. 
I believe it is a desirable time for tile 
Senate to express itself. I have express-
ly sourrht not to put this resolution on 
the calendar. It should properly be re-
ferred to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, to have that committee con-
sider this very important subject. 
I close with these words. The senior 
Senator from Montana has done a great 
service to our country and certainly to 
the Senate, as well as to the free world, 
for having had the courage and the 
patriotism to come forward with what is 
an important proposal, a provocative 
proposal, a very vital proposal, as is evi-
denced by the depth and intensity of my 
own disagreement with it. and by the 
amount of discussion which has resulted 
throughout the world. Knowing the 
Senator from Montana as I do. I know 
he feels as stron;jly about his ov:n ideas 
as he docs about our right to develop our 
ideas. so thai the \\·orld may have a com-
posite of our feelings on this very vital 
question. 
We a re dealing here with a matter 
which is present in men's minds and in 
men's hearts, and also in the resolution 
of the country. I join the Senator from 
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' Montana, whom I love and respect , in 
emphasizing to all the people of America 
the seriousness o! what we are discussing 
today. This Is not a light matter of high 
policy In which we are Indulging as Sena-
tors. The United States is confronted 
here with an obligation of a most serious 
character, which could develop In the 
most serious way, if the Russians insist 
upon tak1ng the path which Khrushchev 
has already laid out. 
Therefore, I close as I began. Not-
withstanding the Intensity of my dis-
agreement, I pay tribute to the Senator 
from Montana for having led us on this 
path where the matter may be discussed 
openly, and where the American people 
may have the benefit of an open discus-
sion of this very serious situation, which 
is so portentous for our future and for 
the future of the whole free world. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
thank the distinguished Senator from 
New York !or his kind comments and for 
his graciousness and consideration in 
sending me in plenty of time an advance 
copy of the speech he has made today 
and of the ~esolution which he has 
submitted. 
If I may, I most respectfully request 
the Senator from New York to remain 
in the Chamber, because I have some 
comments to make on his speech, and 
I have some questions to ask, which I 
believe should be asked for the purpose 
of clarifying the situation which con-
fronts us in the Senate and which con-
fronts the people of the United States, 
as well as the people of Germany and 
Europe and, in a certain sense, the peo-
ple of the world as a whole. 
The Senator from New York is always 
gracious, always thoughtful, always con-
siderate, and always aware of the subject 
to which he addresses himself. I com-
mend him for his contribution today, 
because he has made a real contribution, 
just as he has on previous occasions, be-
ginning with the first speech I made on 
this subject in February of 1959. 
I must disclaim, however, any act of 
courage in advancing my proposals, be-
cause to me it is not an act of courage 
to say what is in one's mind and what 
one feels conscientiously. That he takes 
issue with the remarks which I made 
last Wednesday is not so important as 
that he has helped by his remarks to 
extend the Senate's consideration of this 
highly significant matter. 
I do not wish to presume, but it seems 
to me that much of the Senator's state-
ment was stimulated by what I said last 
week and is directed at specific aspects 
of that statement, or, at any rate, to his 
interpretations of that speech or mis-
interpretations which have occurred or 
might occur elsewhere. 
Since that 1s the case, Mr. President, 
I wonder 11 the Senator from New York 
w111 indulge me so that I may propound 
a series of questions which I hope w111 
-clarify the areas in which we are in 
agreement and those in which we are 
not and which may also help to clear up 
some of the interpretations or misin-
terpretations. 
On page 2 of his statement the Sena-
tor from New York quotes accurately 
from my speech and says: 
The Senator from Montana quite properly 
defines 'the words "stand firm at Berlin." 
He states (that Is the Senator !rom Montana 
states] "the range o! this commitment ex-
tends from a beginning of the words of firm-
ness, to a midpoint of expenditure of Im-
mense resources and enormous taxes and 
other sacrifices, to a final pledge of the !lves 
and fortunes of every man, woman and chlld 
In the Nation." 
Then the Senator from New York 
adds: 
But should that scare us? 
Mr. President, "scare" is in itself a 
scare word. It carries a cringing, cow-
ardly connotation. I feel certain that 
the Senator from New York did not wish 
to leave the impression by its use, that 
merely because the Senator from Mon-
tana described accurately the meaning 
of the words "stand firm at Berlin," he 
was cringing or being cowardly. 
Let me repeat the quotation which the 
Senator from New York has accurately 
stated from my speech: 
The range of this commitment extends 
!rom a beginning of the words of firmness, 
to a midpoint of expenditure of Immense 
resources and enormous taxes and other 
sacrlfies, to a final pledge of the !lves and 
fortunes of every man, woman, and chlld 
In the Nation. 
Let me now change one word in the 
question which the Senator from New 
York asks at the end of the quotation: 
But should that concern us? 
not that the Senator from Montana was 
scared or that I was scared, or that there 
was any thought of cringing, or that the 
Senator was trying to scare us. I was 
trying to compare the risks which we 
would be accepting. 
I agree that there is the risk, and I 
join with the Senator in pointing out to 
the American people that there is this 
awful risk; nonetheless, I feel that the 
altern~J,tive which the Senator presented 
to us was less desirable under those cir-
cumstances and was more likely to lead 
us afoul of the risk than standing where 
we are, at least at this time, on Berlin, 
as I recommend doing. 
Again, I welcome the opportunity the 
Senator from Montana has given me to 
make that viewpoint as pinpointed and 
as crystal cA r as language can make it. 
I was only thinking of the balancing of 
alternatives. while joining with the Sen-
ator in his alternative that we would 
run a risk. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
appreciate the reply of the Senator from 
New York. I ask him to keep in mind 
during the course of our colloquy his 
statement. about our being 180° apart in 
exactly the opposite direction. 
I know the Senator from New York 
has read my speech carefully. Does he 
recall the statement in that speech: 
We prove our courage, our steadfastness, 
our determination when we Insist, as Insist 
we must with all that lns!stance lmplles, 
that we shall not permtt the Russians or any-
I must say to the Senator from New one else to dictate unllaterally the terms 
York that it concerns me very deeply under which this Nation and Its Allles shall 
that the great centers of human civ!liza- discharge the responslbllltles In the wake 
tion In Europe, East and West, and in of World War n . 
the United States, if not throughout Does that suggest to the Senator from 
the world, may be reduced to ruins and New York that the Senator from Man-
tens of m!llions of l!ves, Americans and tana was advocating some kind of re-
others, may be snuffed out at the end treat at Berl!n if the chips eventually 
of the line of any commitment. go down and no satisfactory and ac-
I ask the Senator from New York, if. ceptable alternative to the present situ-
this does not scare him, _as I am sure ation can be found? Does that suggest 
It does not, does it not concern him? that the Senator from Montana does not 
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, w!ll the recognize, in the words o! the Senator 
Senator from Montana yield? from New York that "there are even 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. worse alternatives to danger-for ex-
Mr. JA VITS. It deeply concerns me, ample, the alternative of defeat?" 
as it dee~ly concerns the Senator from Mr. JA VITS. Since I am a lawyer, and 
Montana. I am concerned in exactly the I respect an answer "yes" or "no," my 
same words and with exactly the same answer Is decidedly "No." In other words, 
degree of emotion and feel!ng as he is I join with the Senator from Montana 
concerned. I am del!ghted that he gives fully in the knowledge that he was com-
me the opportunity to state precisely mittlng himself to a determined stand 
what I mean. unless there was a resolution of the issue 
What I mean is that I join with the by agreement. When I said that we were 
Senator from Montana In evaluating the apart on alternatives, I had in mind the 
reasons, as compared with the alterna- actual suggestion or recommendation or 
t!ves, that the Senator from Montana proposal-whatever word one wishes to 
proposed to us. I believe that the risk use-made by the Senator from Montana 
is not so great, or that, at least, in eva!- in this respect, If I may pinpoint it, be-
uating the risk, we should not be so cause the Senator, as usual, is being very 
greatly concerned about the risk as the helpful in this regard. The Senator 
alternative. I used the word "scare" be- from Montana recommended negotia-
cause of the awful, and quite properly tions for a free city of all Berlin. I have 
awful, alternative . which is presented, stated that at this time negotiations for 
should there be a conflict. a free city of all Berlin, or at least nego-
It is my judgment that the alternative tiations beyound the relatively modest 
which is presented leads us down a road • limitations which I have described, 
which Is more likely to end in conflict would be most Inopportune. 
and the very holocaust which the Sena- As the Senator from Montana so well 
tor suggests. knows !rom his vast experience, a pol!cy 
I feel that way as sincerely as the is also a policy if one takes the position 
Senator from Montana feels precisely that he will not negotiate upon f\ certain 
the other way-180 degrees the other ground because he cannot yield upon 
way. What I was trying to convey was that ground. There is no point in ne-
l 
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gotiating on ground on which one can-
not yield. 
I say we are not apart at least as to 
our commitments. I say we are not 
apart in that we have not found a policy 
with respect to Berlin. I do not think 
that is in issue. I think we are apart 
on the question whether we should or 
should not negotiate on the issue of a 
free city for all of Berlin, on which I 
believe we are diametrically apart. 
Just as I think I understand some-
thing about the basic philosophy of the 
Senator from Montana. w I think it is 
very important to state, in a word, my 
own basic view of our present situation 
with respect to Khrushchev. I believe 
Khrushchev thinks right now that he has 
us over a barrel; that he is very strong; 
that the Soviets are away ahead of us; 
and that he can treat us in a rather 
cavalier way. That is his opinion. 
In my opinion, negotiations under 
those circumstances for so momentous 
an end as the resolution of the situation 
concerning Berl'n are likely to be not 
only fruitless but are likely to become 
fruitless. 
As I stated with respect to the West-
ern German elections, it seems to me 
that this is the time when we shall have 
to demonstrate the strength of our posi-
tion, not by words, not simply by saying 
how strong we are, but by integrating 
the free world. 
As I see it, if I were the top general 
in this operation, I would now be driving 
forward in all the things the Senator 
from Montana believes in as completely 
as I do, whether it be the OECD or a 
closer knitting together of NATO, in 
terms of France, or the effort to develop 
the Alliance for Progress in Latin 
America with the aid of Europe, which 
I think we should have in many other 
areas. I would be driving forward for 
the integration of the free world. I 
would not get off, right now, at the sta-
tion of negotiation with Khrushchev on 
a free city of Berlin, or anything else. 
I do not believe that is the way in which 
we can effectuate the best of our pur-
poses in terms of the free world. 
It is always useful to know the basis 
for a man's thinking. I state it quite 
frankly. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from 
New York is always frank. He said if 
he were the general, he would do this, 
that, and the other thing. I can speak 
only as a private, first class. That is the 
only rank I ever achieved in the service. 
I am quite proud of it. because it hap-
pened to be in the Marine Corps. 
I turn now to another aspect of the 
speech of the Senator from New York. 
The Senator from New York has noted 
the speeches made by the Senator from 
Montana in February 1959, and last 
week, and adds: 
The one essential difference which points 
to n.n even greater danger now from the sug-
gestion by Senator MANSFIELD Is In the fact 
that this proposal is mnde on the eve of an 
election campaign In West Germany. 
Is the Senator from New York sug~ 
gesting that the Senator from Montana 
should not speak his mind in the Senate 
of the United States, because of German 
politics? 
Is the Senator from New York aware 
that both principal West German par-
ties taken substantially the same posi-
tion on the question of Berlin-both 
Mr. Adenauer and Mr. Brandt? 
I am sure the Senator from New York 
would agree with that statement and 
would understand 'that position, and 
certainly would not say that because 
an election was going on in another 
country, when time was of the essence, 
a Senator of the United States, in the 
U.S. Senate should not have the right, 
the opportunity, and the privilege to 
speak his own mind. 
If the answer to that is in the affirma-
tive, what adverse effect in Germany 
does the Senator from New York an-
ticipate from remarks made by the Sen-
ator from Montana in the Senate of the 
United States? Will they help Mr. 
Adenaucr or Mr. Brandt? So far as I 
am aware, they can hardly help the 
Communists in \'Vest Germany, since 
that party is ille3"al. 
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the 
Senator from Montana yield? 
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. MET-
CALF in the chair). Does the Senator 
from Montana yield to the Senator from 
New York? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. JA VITS. I was not talking about 
the Senator's words, much as I re~pect 
them, and much as I admire the Sen-
ator from Montana. Instead, I was 
talking about adopting the Senator's 
suggestion or if a dozen of the other 
Members of the Senate supported the 
Senator's suggestion, rather than took 
the other position, I believe that could 
have a material effect on the West Ger-
man election campaign. 
Incidentally, in the course of my 
speech I noted-although it was not in-
cluded in my prepared remarks, and thus 
perhaps the Senator from Montana was 
not aware of this-that it is a fact that, 
as of now, both the German parties-
both the party headed by Willie Brandt 
and the party headed by Chancellor 
Adenauer-take the same position on 
Berlin. I pointed out that with the un-
certainties of German politics being 
what they are, one would not know what 
would happen in a German election if we 
gave what I called in 1959 "the word" 
that we were caving in on Berlin-which 
woulp be my construction of the Sen-
ator's suggestion. I could be mistaken, 
of course; but, nonetheless, I would be 
less than honest if I did not say that 
is my view. And in that respect, I think 
it could have a profound effect on the 
German election. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. 
to another aspect of 
Senator from New 
that-
Now let me turn 
the speech of the 
York. He noted 
The whole difference In thinking between 
people !Ike myself and Senator MANSFIELD 
Is this: "Shall It be the aim a.nd objective 
of the free world to struggle for a unified 
Germany or shall the free world accept a 
divided Germany?" 
There are differences between the Sen-
ator fr9m New York and the Senator 
from Montana, but I do not believe this 
particular difference is accurately stated. 
The question is not "shall," but "how" 
shall the free world struggle for a uni-
fied Germany. 
I submit that we have struggled for a 
decade and a half in the fashion sug-
gested by the Senator from New York, 
and we have spent public funds far in 
excess of $1.5 billion in the city of Berlin 
alone. On this point, I must ask the 
Senator from New York whether he 
thinks the unity of Germany is any 
closer now than it was 15 or 16 years 
ago. 
Mr. JAVITS. Does the Senator from 
Montana wish me to answer the ques-
tions as he asks them? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. 
Mr. JAVITS. I do believe that Ger-
many is closer to unification now than 
it was 15 or 16 years ago. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Why? 
Mr. JAVITS. I shall state why. It is 
for two reasons: First, because West 
Germany is prosperous, has made a suc-
cess as a democratic state, and has a 
strong government which generally is 
supported by its people; and it seems 
to me that those constitute absolutely 
unbelievable differences between the 
situation now and the situation 15 or 
16 years ago; second-and also very im-
portant-a great segment Of the Ger-
man people, to wit, 48 million of them. 
has been accepted by the Western World, 
and, indeed, by the entire world, as re-
spectable citizens; and this, too, in terms 
of what the East Germans seek, repre-
sents a very major difference between 
their position today and their position 
16 years ago. 
It seems to me that these are two 
enormous contributions toward the ulti-
mate unification of Germany. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Well, Mr. Presi-
dent, let me say the Senator from New 
York is a great deal more optimistic 
than I am and, I think, a great deal 
more optimistic than most people are, 
because I noticed that he confined his 
remarks to West Germany alone, and 
brought in East Germany only inciden-
tally. He did not bring out the fact that 
Khrushchev has stated four or five times, 
and has stated it this time with a dead-
line, that he expects to get out of East 
Berlin, so that control of the city would 
be turned over to the Pankow· govern-
ment, even though a symbolic segment 
of allied troops, including Soviet soldiers, 
would be retained there. 
Does the Senator from New York 
think that the expenditure of a few 
more billions, some lives, or, finally, a 
nuclear war would bring about a unifi-
cation of Germany? Or is the Senator 
from •New York so sanguine that, on the 
basis of the progress made over the past 
16 years, he believes it is only, a matter 
of waiting a few more years in order to 
have this much-desired and much-
needed-in my opinion_:-unification 
brought about? 
Mr. JAVITS. On the contrary, I am 
not sanguine as to the time. I am only 
discussing whether conditions now are 
more promising now than they were 16 
years ago. I think they are more prom-
ising now. 
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But as to the time, it may take several 
more decades to do anything about the 
unification of Germany. 
As regards our entire concept and 
policy, it seems to me that all our people 
have to gird themselves for this eventu-
ality, because again-inasmuch as we 
have been discussing the spending of 
money and foreign _ aid-we are very 
much interested in what we spend; and 
I could not agree more. But we also 
must consider what we have to spend it 
for. If the free world is growing, develop-
ing, and producing more, although we 
may have, certainly, to invest more 
money in the situation that Berlin is in 
right now, it may be a very good invest-
ment; and I think it is. 
For example, let us think what lt would 
mean to Khrushchev if he had the kind 
of demonstration laboratory for commu-
nism that we have for freedom, right 
smack in the middle of the whole Iron 
Curtain. It seems to me he would not 
be worried whether he spent a few hun-
dred million dollars a year for that. So 
we should not be worried about it, and 
that should not be a reason for our 
adopting the stated alternative, which in 
my opinion could only lead us "down the 
drain" in respect to this situation. 
Of CC'urse I can understand why the 
Senator from Montana and all others 
would be very unhappy about the fact 
that 16 years have passed; but I have 
made the point as to wh~ I believe uni-
fication is now in a better frame of 
reference. 
But I am the first to agree that these 
are not the major points for negotiation; 
we are not getting anywhere in that re-
spect. Nevertheless, we are engaged in 
a long struggle, of which this is a phase; 
and I believe this is one of the key phases, 
because what we do in Berlin, right in 
the heart of the Iron Curtain countries, 
and as it relates to all the rest of Europe, 
will be the key in regard to the extent of 
our fortitude in respect to all other 
phases of this matter. If we display 
fortitude in regard to Berlin, the world 
will, in the final analysis, know that we 
can be relied on, and thus the rest of the 
world will be with us. But if we did not 
display fortitude in regard to Berlin, I 
fear that we would lose the confidence 
and the support of the rest of the world. 
That is the basis of my position. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. On this point, the 
Senator from New York notes that "the 
Mansfield speech proposes that we ac-
cept a divided Germany." 
If the Senator from New York means 
by that, formal recognition of East Ger-
many, I must respectfully request that 
he point out where in my speech that is 
suggested. And if he does not mean 
recognition, then I must ask what he 
does mean. What is implied in this 
speech that does not already exist and 
has existed for a decade or more, except 
that East Berlin will be taken out of the 
hands of the Communists and, along 
with West Berlin, placed under interna-
tional control until such time as Ger-
many achieves unification? 
Mr. JAVITS. Where I think the Sen-
ator from Montana and I differ so sharp-
ly is that if a "free city" were made of 
West Berlin, under the conditions the 
Senator has specified, it would not be 
long before all of Berlin would be a 
Communist city thoroughly incorporated 
into East Germar.y. 
What I had in mind to say-although, 
of course, words are always inartistic-
is that by no mean do I think the Sen-
ator wants a divided Germany. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Or recognition· of 
East Germany. 
Mr. JAVITS. I am sure of that, too. 
And if the Senator did not think so, I 
am sure he would not have made the 
speech. I am rather well acquainted 
with what the Senator thinks. 
But regardless of whatever connota-
tion may be placed on the speech of the 
Senator from Montana, and regardless 
of whatever he may think, I wish to state 
that I believe the "free city" concept 
would lead to precisely what the Sen-
ator from Montana does not want, any 
more than it is what I '!YP.Jtt; and t!1,_at is 
.;:f'~ I made the sneerJ1JW<. ·MPNS FIEJ.P. 
Now, Mr. President, I come to strri 
another matter raised in the speech of 
the Senator from New York. This re-
fers to my role as Majority Leader. 
Does the Senato1· from New York se-
riously believe that Bonn, London, Paris, 
or even Moscow, are so ignorant of our 
system of government that they do not 
recognize that a Senator is first of all 
a Senator and has certain obligations in 
that role distinct from those which he 
may play in the conduct of the Senate's 
business? Does the Senator from New 
York seriously believe that this Nation 
and other nations will pay less attention 
to the speech which the Senator from 
New York is now making than they did 
to the speech of the Senator from Mon-
tana? If there is any real doubt on this 
score, it is not necessary for the Presi-
dent to clear it up, for the President's 
prerogatives do not extend into this 
body. I shall clear it up myself. I have 
already tried to do that. I will do it 
once more by emphasizing that the 
speech of the Senator from New York 
should be listened to, both at home and 
abroad, at the very least, with just as 
much attention as the statement of the 
Senator from Montana or any other 
Senator. 
There is only one final point which I 
wish to clarify with respect to the speech 
with the Senate has just heard by the 
distinguished Senator from New York. 
The Senator from New York states: 
It is freely predicted and quite properly 
that 1! we accept this proposal for a free 
city of Berlln, all of Berlln would be Com-
munist within 6 months--and Germany 
would remain forever divided. 
Would the Senator from New York 
wish to leave the impression that the 
small garrisons in West Berlin alone de-
fend the city, or would he say that the 
guarantees of the United States, France, 
and the United Kingdom, backed by 
NATO, have a great deal to do with it? 
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield at that point? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. JAVITS. I merely wish to say 
that the symbol that is our force is 
known to the world to be a core for all 
our resources to back it up. I had no 
doubt that, certainly, the few thousand 
men we have there did not represent the 
defense of Berlin and West Germany. 
What I had in mind to point out was 
what, in my view, would happen, and I 
gave the analogy of Danzig. I have 
spoken to people who had escaped from 
Nazi Germany and who had pronounced 
views. I thought if we got into the free 
city concept, the free city would not last, 
and it would speedily be incorporated 
into Communist Germany, notwith-
standing any guarantees; that our guar-
antees would suffer in the same way they 
are suffering now at the hands of the 
Pathet Lao in Laos, notwithstanding 
that we have guarantees. 
The fact is that possession is more 
than nine-tenths of the law in terms of 
international affairs, unless we are pre-
pared to go in with force. 
It was my view that the country is in 
a better position now than it would be 
if we got into negotiations as a result 
of which West Berlin would be a free 
city. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Not West Berlin-
all Berlin. 
Mr. JAVITS. Yes. Of course, the 
Senator made that very clear. 
May I say to the Senator from Mon-
tana, because the Senator apparently is 
coming to the terminal point of the in-
terrogation, there is no sure science 
about this. The most we can do is do 
what we can to understand it by the 
dynamics of the present situation and by 
analogy. 
One of the members of our committee 
said something that to me was very in-
teresting. He spoke of a great news-
paper editor. He had asked him, "What 
is the qualification of a topflight news-
paperman?" This great editor had said: 
Read history, read history, read history, 
read history. That is the best qualification . 
Really, that is what we are doing here, 
both in terms of the past, in another 
totalitarian era, and in terms of con-
temporaneous events, which I read in 
terms of their connotations, and view 
the free city concept differently from 
the Senator from Montana. 
That is really our main point. I see 
in it the basis for East Germany getting 
everything the Russians wanted to get 
for East Berlin, therefore making per-
manent that the Neisse-Oder line is the 
end of the road; that what was the most 
advanced and hopeful position for the 
nations of Europe has gone down the 
drain, and only thereby fortified the bal-
ance against us, rather than the other 
way. 
I say, notwithstanding the risk. which 
I and the Senator from Montana agree 
is there, the risk must be taken, because 
the alternative the Senator proposes is 
too dire. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate what 
the Senator has said. 
Is the Senator aware that what the 
Senator from Montana advocated was 
not the weakening of these guarantees, 
but an extension of them to all Berlin 
if it were made into a free city? 
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, if the 
Senator will yield, of course, I was aware 
of that. 
To me, the analogy goes to other places 
where we have had guarantees, where 
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the Communists are in a position to 
get in, and will put us in the situation 
where the guarantees are still guaran-
tees, but the balance of the worth of 
taking more risk is more the other way 
than it is in Berlin. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Except the Rus-
sians are now in a position to go in, and 
the present situation is not to have them 
leave East Berlin, which is the western-
most portion into which the Communists 
have penetrated at the present time; 
the present position is to have them to 
stay there. 
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. 
Mr. JAVITS. Again, I am speaking 
as a Senator. I appreciate the kind 
words of the Senator from Montana 
about the importance of my views. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. They are impor-
tant. 
Mr. JAWTS. I thank the Senator. 
But I respectfully submit the world will 
attach even more importance to the 
words of the majority leader, deeply as 
I feel about my own views. For me, I 
do not see that we have any eligilibility 
to say to the Communists, "You must 
stay in East Berlin or in East Germany." 
They can pull out if they want to. They 
may be violating agreements. There 
may be debatable legal subject. But it 
is the old story which lawyers will always 
remind us of. There is an old case, 
called Lumley against Wagner, which 
settled a question in the old English 
law. The case involved Covent Gardens, 
which had a contract with a singer. It 
was pointed out by the court that con-
tracts with singers cannot be enforced, 
because singers could sing off key, and 
they could not be forced to sing correctly, 
but they could be prevented from singing 
for somebody else. 
So far as the Russians are concerned, 
they can get out of East Germany or East 
Berlin. There is little we can do about 
it. But it is a diff~rent thing, when we 
have not taken our position on a free 
city or pulled out our token forces or 
token authority, when we depend upon 
the precedent of the airlift in 1948, and 
when, as the Senator suggests, we change 
the whole situation and have a free city 
government, with its own capacity to 
deal with the Russians and the East 
German regime, and when the East Ger-
main regime has been recognized by us 
in a legal sense. I think the whole sit-
uation is radically different in terms of 
our staying there and defending and 
maintaining our position, and I think an 
analogy is what has happened in Laos. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Unfortunately, I do 
not think anybody is saying we want 
them out of East Berlin. We want 
them out of Laos, Czechoslovakia, Po-
land, and other countries. We want the 
30 divisions in East Germany withdrawn 
beyond the Oder-Neisse. The only place 
we do not want them to pull out of is 
East Berlin. We want them to stay. 
The entire city, I may say, would be 
guaranteed under what I have suggested 
as it really is now, with the addition of 
the whole weight of world opinion if its 
status were threatened. 
Mr. President, I wish to say that this 
has been most fruitful, educational and 
worth while. so far as I am concerned. I 
commend the Senator from New York 
again for joining in this discussion. He 
is a man of great intellect, of great abil-
ity and of great integrity. I shall study 
his speech carefully even as I have read 
it with interest. Some of his proposaJs 
are not t r,o different from those which I 
suggested in February 1959 and which, 
indeed, were pursued at Geneva in 1959. 
I wish to say that the Senator from 
New York has performed a service by 
reducing his thoughts to the form of a 
resolution. It desetTes every considera-
tion. I wish to study his proposals most 
carefully, even as the Committee on For-
eign Relations wiH \'.'ant t.o do the same. 
At first reading, it seems to contain much 
merit along the lines that negotiations 
were proceeding between the previous 
administration and the Soviet Union un-
til they were brought to an abrupt halt 
by the ill-fated Paris Conference after 
the ill-fated U-2 incident. 
Again I thank and commend the dis-
tinguished Senator from New York. 
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, if my col-
league will yield I should like to recipro-
cate fully his very warm and most gra-
cious statements, and state my respects 
and regard for him. I. too, feel that by 
taking the interest which he has taken 
in reading my speech and asking these 
questions he has helped me to refine and 
present my thesis even better than I 
should have been able to do it unilater-
ally. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is al-
ways kind. 
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